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N response to my article on the past and future of tax reform, Profes-
sor Zelinsky restates several of his positions on federal income tax pol-
icy that I had criticized in my earlier article.' Professor Zelinsky's reply
raises a new issue, however, which he believes underlies our disagree-
ments on tax policy: the proper scope of federal activity in attacking so-
cial ills.2 In Professor Zelinsky's view, my opposition to tax expenditures
does not derive primarily from considerations of technical tax policy, but
instead reflects a fundamental skepticism about federal intervention in
the market that is shared by advocates of supply-side economics.' Pro-
fessor Zelinsky distinguishes himself from this position by identifying
with the proponents of a more liberal, interventionist national govern-
ment, such as the late Senators Hubert Humphrey and Paul Douglas.4
The main purpose of this rejoinder is to reject the identification of my
position on tax incentives with supply-side economics and to show that
even proponents of a liberal, interventionist federal government have
strong reasons to prefer direct subsidies to tax incentives as the means of
attacking major social problems. Part I shows that previous articles on
the relationship between tax and efficiency had focused almost entirely
on the use of the Internal Revenue Code ("the Code") to improve alloca-
tive efficiency. In his response, Professor Zelinsky, while continuing to
endorse the selective enactment of tax incentives, accepts virtually all of
my specific criticisms of pre-1986 and existing tax incentives on the
grounds of allocative efficiency. Part II points out that the focus of Pro-
fessor Zelinsky's concerns seems to have shifted from the use of tax in-
centives to achieve allocative efficiency to their use to achieve
* Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law; B.A. 1968, Columbia Uni-
versity; J.D. 1971, Harvard University.
1. In his original article, Professor Zelinsky argued that there is no general reason to
prefer direct subsidy programs over tax incentives on the grounds of technical efficiency,
including relative effects on taxpayer morale, ease of administration, and degree of legis-
lative review. See Zelinsky, Efficiency and Income Taxes The Rehabilitation of Tax In-
centives, 64 Tex. L. Rev. 973, 1026-30 (1986) [hereinafter Zelinsky, Rehabilitation]. In
my original article, I challenged the case for tax incentives on grounds of technical effi-
ciency. See Yorio, Equity, Efficiency, and the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 55 Fordham L
Rev. 410-13 nn.74-97 (1987). In his reply, Professor Zelinsky restates and elaborates on
the case for tax incentives from the perspective of technical efficiency. See Zelinsky, The
Tax Reform Act of 1986: A Response to Professor Yorio and His Vision of the Future of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, 55 Fordham L. Rev. 885 (1987) [hereinafter Zelinsky,
Response].
2. See Zelinsky, Response, supra note 1, at 885-86 nn. 6-9.
3. See id. at 888-89 nn. 28-32, 894 nn. 71-73.
4. See id. at 886-87 nn. 10-16, 889 nn. 31-32.
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redistribution of societal resources. Part III argues that, even if redistri-
bution is the goal of a particular federal policy, a direct subsidy program
will usually be a more efficient and equitable vehicle for effectuating the
policy than a tax incentive.5
I. ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY AND THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
Prior to the publication of Professor Zelinsky's original article, schol-
ars almost universally condemned tax incentives for inducing overpro-
duction or overconsumption of tax-favored goods or services, thereby
distorting the allocation of resources in society.6 Using economic models
based primarily on the Accelerated Cost Recovery System and the mort-
gage interest deduction, Professor Zelinsky demonstrated that a tax in-
centive may actually improve efficiency under certain circumstances by
curing imperfections in the market, such as barriers to entry and positive
externalities.7
In the article to which Professor Zelinsky responds in this issue, I
agreed with him that, on a theoretical level, a case could be made for tax
incentives as cures for market failure.' I demonstrated, however, that
the incentives contained in the Code prior to the passage of the Tax Re-
form Act of 1986 ("the 1986 Act") were not intended and did not oper-
ate in fact to remedy market failures9 and that as a practical matter, few,
if any, tax incentives could be justified on that basis."° I also advocated
5. I recognize, of course, that the most direct method of achieving redistribution of
income in society may be the adoption of a progressive income tax. With all other things
being equal, the greater the degree of progression in income tax rates, the greater is the
amount of redistribution of income. My earlier article demonstrated, however, that a
tension exists between progressive tax rates and tax equity and economic efficiency. High
marginal tax rates exacerbate tax inequity between taxpayers with the same amount of
income, increase allocative distortions by inducing taxpayers to pursue tax preferences,
and generate transaction costs in tax-planning to avoid the effects of progression. See
Yorio, supra note 1, at 441-42 nn. 327-331.
The merits of using progressive tax rates to achieve redistribution are not considered by
Professor Zelinsky's reply. Indeed, by generally supporting the 1986 Act, Professor Ze-
linsky implicitly seems to endorse the dramatic reduction in marginal tax rates brought
about by that Act. See Zelinsky, Response, supra note I, at 885, 888 n.29. The critical
issue raised by Professor Zelinsky's reply is whether government spending to achieve re-
distribution should take the form of tax expenditures or direct subsidies. See infra text
accompanying notes 31-33.
6. See, e.g., Auerbach, The New Economics of Accelerated Depreciation, 23 B.C.L.
Rev. 1327, 1345-50 (1982) (ACRS is "very distortionary in its distribution across differ-
ent assets"); Graetz & McDowell, Tax Reform 1985: The Quest for a Fairer, More Effi-
cient and Simpler Income Tax, 3 Yale L. & Pol'y Rev. 5, 17-18 (1984) (incentives
encourage "the inefficient allocation of resources"); Hendershott, The Impact of Tax Re-
form on the Slope of the Playing Field, 31 Tax Notes 1107, 1107-08 (1986) (incentives tilt
the playing field in favor of certain industries); Yorio, The President's Tax Proposals: A
Major Step in the Right Direction, 53 Fordham L. Rev. 1255, 1286-88 (1985) (criticism of
various tax incentives for causing economic distortions).
7. See Zelinsky, Rehabilitation, supra note 1, at 996-1009.
8. See Yorio, supra note 1, at 417 n.132.
9. See id. at 415-17 nn.117-32.
10. See id. at 419-21 nn.151-65.
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the repeal (or restriction) of many of the preferences surviving in the
Code after the 1986 Act on the ground (among others) that they distort
resource allocation without operating to cure market failures."
Professor Zelinsky indicates in his response that he accepts virtually
all of my conclusions regarding the inefficiency of prior and existing tax
incentives.12 He agrees, for example, that pre-1986 tax expenditures
were "an amalgam of incoherent special interest legislation"; 3 that in-
side build-up of interest on life insurance policies should be recognized as
income;14 that the exclusions for tax-exempt bonds and fringe benefits,
even as reformed by the 1986 Act, are troubling;' 5 and that the current
mortgage interest deduction should be replaced by a deduction for a lim-
ited amount of interest on a taxpayer's principal residence.' 6
Having accepted my criticisms of these specific tax incentives, Profes-
sor Zelinsky need not embrace my general skepticism about using tax
incentives as cures for market failure. In his view, Congress is not con-
demned to repeat the mistakes of the past because tax expenditures anal-
ysis has alerted it to the dangers posed by certain types of tax
incentives.17 The task for Congress and the public is to craft different tax
incentives that meet the objections of tax expenditure critics.' 8
II. REDISTRIBUTION AND THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
To the extent that Professor Zelinsky is again raising the theoretical
possibility that a tax incentive may be an effective cure for market failure,
I, of course, agree.19 Unlike Professor Zelinsky, I remain convinced that,
even with the advent of tax expenditure analysis, the difficulty of quanti-
fying the benefits of a tax incentive and of assessing the effects of other
government programs make it unlikely that a particular tax incentive
could be convincingly defended as a cure for market failure.2° Moreover,
my own skepticism about market failure defenses of tax incentives is im-
plicitly supported by the absence in Professor Zelinsky's response of any
justification based on market failure for federal intervention in the two
areas of his primary concern, low-income housing and jobs for the poor.
11. See id. at 441-57 nn.324-449.
12. See Zelinsky, Response, supra note 1, at 894 n.71. Regarding my proposals for
reform, Professor Zelinsky indicates that he holds a different position only with respect to
the deductions for state and local taxes and charitable contributions. See id. at 26 n.84
(nn.82-84). He has, however, criticized the deduction for state and local taxes in its cur-
rent form on other grounds. See Zelinsky, The Deductibility of State and Local Taxes
Income Measurement, Tax Expenditures and Partial, Functional Deductibility, 7 Am. J.
Tax Policy (forthcoming).
13. See Zelinsky, Response, supra note 1, at 894 n.71.
14. See id. at 896 n.83.
15. See id. at 896 n.84.
16. See id. at 895 n.74.
17. See id. at 894 nn.71-72, 27.
18. See id. at 895-97.
19. See supra text accompanying note 8.
20. See Yorio, supra note 1, at 418-21 nn.143-65.
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With respect to housing, Professor Zelinsky states simply that "there
generally is not enough profit in low-income housing to entice private
providers."21 As I understand this argument, the problem with regard to
low-income housing is not market failure, but that the poor do not com-
mand sufficient resources to afford decent housing. With respect to jobs,
Professor Zelinsky states that "the problem of structural unemployment
is a serious one that the market should not to be expected to solve on its
own." 2 Whether he is alluding to problems of market failure is doubt-
ful, however, because he adduces no specific evidence of failure in the
employment market.23
At this point, I should make clear that I regard the lack of affordable
housing and jobs for the poor as a very real and disturbing social problem
for which some form of government intervention may be necessary. In
that respect, I reject Professor Zelinsky's characterization of my position
on income tax policy as an aversion to government intervention in "soft-
ening the rougher edges of a market economy."24 But I would not rest
the case for programs to benefit the poor on the grounds of market fail-
ure. I recognize, of course, that it is possible to craft market failure de-
fenses for government intervention in the employment market.25 Trade
unions and licensing or educational requirements might operate as barri-
ers to entry in certain job markets;26 unemployment might lead some of
the poor to resort to crime, thereby creating a negative externality for the
remainder of the population.27 Government intervention in the job mar-
ket thus could be defended as a means of overcoming barriers to entry or
of reducing the costs of a negative externality. 8
Although Professor Zelinsky's response may implicitly rely on argu-
ments of this type to justify federal intervention in the employment and
housing markets, I interpret the absence of specific market failure ratio-
nales in the response as an implicit admission that the case for govern-
ment intervention rests primarily on ethical rather than economic
grounds.29 Indeed, even if there was absolutely no evidence that
problems of market failure were associated with the scarcity of housing
21. See Zelinsky, Response, supra note 1, at 895 n.78.
22. See id. at 896 nn.79-80.
23. Although Professor Zelinsky's earlier article noted that minimum wage laws op-
erate as a barrier to entry in the employment market, see Zelinsky, Rehabilitation, supra
note 1, at 1034 & n.133, this problem results not from the market itself, but from govern-
ment interference in the market's operation.
24. See Zelinsky, Response, supra note 1, at 887 n. 12.
25. Cf R. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 439-41 (3d ed. 1986) (welfare programs
may be defended as a means of overcoming free-rider problems).
26. See A. Schotter, Free Market Economics 69 (1985). For a government-imposed
barrier to entry in the labor market, see supra note 23.
27. See R. Posner, supra note 25, at 439; A. Schotter, supra note 26, at 76-77.
28. See Schotter, supra note 26, at 78-80.
29. Cf Donohue & Ayre, Posner's Symphony No. 3: Thinking About the Unthinkable,
39 Stan. L. Rev. 791, 799 (1987) ("[W]ealth maximization is devoid of normative signifi-
cance. This realization permits us to return to the fundamentally sounder notion that
poverty is bad because it hurts the poor.").
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and jobs for the poor, I suspect that he (and I) would endorse some form
of government intervention on their behalf.3" I believe, therefore, that
the fundamental issue raised by Professor Zelinsky's response is not allo-
cative efficiency, but the proper level of federal activity in redistributing
societal resources for the benefit of the poor.31 On this issue, individual
judgments will surely differ, as Professor Zelinsky himself suggests. 32
But if I am correct that the case for certain tax incentives derives from
ethical rather than economic considerations, we should face the question
of redistribution directly, recognizing that economic models of market
failure are unlikely to produce a scientifically "correct" result. 33
III. DIRECT SUBSIDIES AND TAX INCENTIVES
Assuming that a particular social problem requires government inter-
vention, the next issue is whether intervention should take the form of
direct subsidies or tax incentives.34 Professor Zelinsky argues that the
choice between a direct subsidy and a tax expenditure will vary depend-
ing on the problem and the audience that the government expects to in-
fluence.35 He contrasts this position with what he interprets as my
implacable opposition to tax incentives as a device for implementing gov-
ernment policy.
36
As with other parts of his analysis,37 it is impossible to disagree, in
theory, with Professor Zelinsky's argument that a tax incentive may be a
more efficient method of accomplishing a particular governmental objec-
tive than a direct subsidy. But on a practical level, the case constructed
30. That state intervention may be proper even when the market operates perfectly is
a point recently made by Professor Owen Fiss in a context very different from federal
income taxation. See Fiss, Why the State?, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 781, 787-88 (1987). Noting
that competition among the large and powerful media of communication is far from per-
fect, he recognizes that state intervention may be useful in improving the market in public
discourse. See id. at 787. But even a perfectly competitive market in speech would not
reflect society's need for an informed electorate. See id. at 788. Thus, Professor Fiss
argues that state intervention is necessary not "to perfect the market (as it would under a
theory of market failure), but rather to supplement it." "The state is to act as the correc-
tive for the market" by allowing issues and viewpoints to be raised and debated that
otherwise might be systematically ignored or stifled. See id.
31. My conclusion that redistribution, not allocative efficiency, is primarily at issue in
Professor Zelinsky's response is also bolstered by his identification with the positions of
"liberal" political figures, such as the late Senators Humphrey and Douglas. See Zelin-
sky, Response, supra note 1, at 886-87 nn.10-16. See supra text accompanying note 4.
32. See Zelinsky, Response, supra note I, at 894-95.
33. The economist Henry Simons advocated similar intellectual candor in a related
context. Although a supporter of progressive taxation, he rejected as spurious various
scientifically-based justifications for progression. He preferred, instead, to admit that the
case for progressive taxation rested on ethical or esthetic grounds. See H. Simons, Per-
sonal Income Taxation 16-19 (1938).
34. See Yorio, supra note 1, at 421 nn.165-66 (analysis of whether direct subsidy or
tax incentive is better means of curing market failure).
35. See Zelinsky, Response, supra note 1, at 891-94 nn.55-70.
36. See id. at 890 n.40, 894 nn.70-71.
37. See supra text accompanying note 8.
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by Professor Zelinsky for tax incentives depends on Congress's undergo-
ing two implausible metamorphoses: resisting its prior urge to imbibe the
nectar of tax incentives;3" and reforming its procedures to give commit-
tees other than the House Ways and Means and the Senate Finance
Committees a substantial input in the process of drafting and approving
tax legislation.39 In my previous article, I explained that the political
ease of enacting tax incentives makes it unlikely that tax incentives would
be subjected to the same cost-benefit analysis applied to direct expendi-
ture programs.4° I agree with Professor Zelinsky that if Congress is con-
templating a particular tax incentive, non-tax committees should review
and approve the legislation. But until Congress actually reforms its pro-
cedures in this respect, tax incentives are unlikely to be as carefully
crafted and controlled as direct subsidies.4"
In my earlier article, I also criticized tax incentives for eroding tax-
payer confidence in the fairness of the tax system and for undermining a
self-assessment system of raising revenue.42 I argued that dissatisfaction
with direct subsidy programs is less likely to affect taxpayer compliance
than a pervasive feeling that the tax system is unfair because the nexus
between direct subsidies and the tax system is more remote.4 3 In his re-
sponse, Professor Zelinsky counters that "taxpayers perceive a connec-
tion between the taxes they pay and and the public outlays others
receive"'  and that resentment about direct subsidy programs "[is] also
likely to cause noncompliance with the tax system."4 Without denying
that many, perhaps even all, taxpayers grasp the connection between
taxes and expenditures and that dissatisfaction with direct subsidy pro-
grams may affect taxpayer compliance to some extent, I perceive the is-
sue to be which form of disenchantment has a greater deleterious effect
on taxpayer compliance. On this issue, I place considerable weight on
the testimony of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue,46 on the Treas-
ury Report to the President,47 and on empirical evidence,48 all of which
point to a strong correlation between the level of taxpayer compliance
38. See Zelinsky, Response, supra note 1, at 894 nn.70-72.
39. See id. at 891 nn.47-51.
40. See Yorio, supra note 1, at 424-25 nn.187-95.
41. See id. at 425 nn.193-95.
42. See id. at 425-26 nn.196-99.
43. See id. at 426 n.198.
44. See Zelinsky, Response, supra note 1, at 891 n.54.
45. See id. at 891 nn.53-54.
46. See New IRS Commissioner Gibbs Sees Tax Compliance Benefits from Overhaul
Bill, 176 Daily Tax Rep. (BNA), at K-1 (Sept. 11, 1986) (comments of IRS Commis-
sioner Gibbs that perceptions of fairness will increase compliance).
47. See 1 Department of the Treasury, The Treasury Department Report to the Presi-
dent: Tax Reform for Fairness, Simplicity, and Economic Growth 16 (1984) (perception
of unfairness is different when tax system, rather than subsidy program, is regarded as
unfair).
48. See Witte & Woodbury, The Effect of Tax Laws and Tax Administration on Tax
Compliance: The Case of the U.S. Individual Income Tax, 38 Nat'l Tax J. 1, 9 (1985)
(taxpayer attitudes about the system affect the level of compliance).
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and attitudes about the fairness of the tax system, and on the absence of
evidence showing a similar correlation between taxpayer compliance and
disenchantment with direct subsidy programs.
In his reply,49 Professor Zelinsky elaborates on his earlier argument
that direct subsidy programs may generate transaction costs exceeding
the costs of equivalent tax expenditures.50 He admits, however, that with
respect to large businesses, direct subsidies will normally be less costly
than tax incentives51 and that the costs of operating parallel direct sub-
sidy and tax expenditure programs will be greater than the costs gener-
ated by a single, direct subsidy program.52 These admissions severely
undercut the case for tax incentives. The success of many governmental
programs may require the participation of large businesses simply be-
cause of their great control over societal resources.5 3 Moreover, I do not
envision a time in the immediate future when the federal government will
eliminate existing direct subsidy programs addressed to major social ills,
such as the scarcity of housing and jobs for the poor. If these programs
survive, the issue then becomes whether Congress should enact (or pre-
serve) tax legislation that adds to the bureaucracies of the Department of
Labor and the Department of Housing and Urban Development another
level of bureaucracy, in the Internal Revenue Service, devoted to the
problems of low-income housing and structural unemployment. By pos-
iting the continued existence of an elaborate professional tax network
and then comparing the marginal costs of direct subsidies and tax ex-
penditures,54 Professor Zelinsky fails to address my primary argument
that overall transactions costs would be reduced by eliminating tax subsi-
dies and consolidating governmental efforts to overcome social problems
in direct subsidies programs.55
Perhaps the best way of illustrating my disagreements with Professor
Zelinsky on the relative merits of direct subsidies and tax incentives is to
consider his proposals to retain tax credits for low-income housing and to
exempt these credits from the recently enacted limitations on the deduct-
49. See Zelinsky, Response, supra note 1, at 891-93 nn.55-69.
50. See Zelinsky, Rehabilitation, supra note 1, at 1010-12.
51. See Zelinsky, Response, supra note 1, at 893 n.64.
52. See id at 893 nn.68-69.
53. See Yorio, supra note 1, at 427-28 nn.206-07. With respect to creating jobs for the
disadvantaged, for example, I cannot imagine a government program, be it a tax incentive
or direct subsidy, that would not require the participation of large businesses. Professor
Zelinsky counters that most new jobs in the economy are generated by small businesses.
See Zelinsky, Response, supra note 1, at 24 (n.80); see also Zelinsky, Rehabilitation, supra
note 1, at 1034 ("current growth of employment in this country stems from predomi-
nantly small businesses"). That argument, even if valid, may simply be a reflection of the
preponderance of small businesses in the American economy. In any event, the argument
does not refute my contention that large businesses, because of the great control they
exercise over societal resources, are likely participants in any government program
designed to alleviate unemployment among the poor.
54. See Zelinsky, Response, supra note 1, at 891-93 nn.55-69; Zelinsky, Rehabilitation,
supra note 1, at 1010-12.
55. See Yorio, supra note 1, at 428 nn.207-08.
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ibility of passive losses.56 I disagree with both proposals. To begin with,
market failure does not provide a convincing rationale for either propo-
sal. Rather, the issue raised is whether societal resources should be redis-
tributed to benefit the poor.57 Viewed from that perspective, it is ironic
that Professor Zelinsky's proposals would provide incentives to develop-
ers to build or to upper-income professionals to invest in low-income
housing, which would have the effect of reducing their marginal tax rates
and causing horizontal tax inequity between them and other taxpayers.5
In his response, Professor Zelinsky makes, but does not endorse, other
suggestions for dealing with the scarcity of low-income housing, includ-
ing vouchers or refundable tax credits for low-income families to offset,
at least in part, the cost of housing.59 Because they attack the problem of
economic inequality directly and avoid horizontal tax inequity, both
vouchers and tax credits for the poor are preferable to tax credits to de-
velopers or investors in low-income housing. As between a voucher and
a refundable tax credit, the case for a voucher seems stronger because it
may be inefficient to require certain low-income families to file tax re-
turns solely to obtain a refundable housing credit' and because govern-
ment supervision to ensure that public outlays are actually being spent on
housing would probably be less costly if implemented through existing
local welfare systems than through the Internal Revenue Service.
CONCLUSION
Professor Zelinsky and I disagree about many aspects of federal in-
come tax policy. Despite our disagreements, we share a common ground
in endorsing the basic thrust of the 1986 Act. More importantly from a
practical perspective, our agendas for future reform of the income tax
contain many of the same proposals.6 ' If two students of the income tax
with divergent views nevertheless agree that the task of tax reform is
incomplete, the message to those in Congress who seek additional reve-
nues, or who seek to reduce marginal tax rates even further, is clear:
repeal (or restrict) those preferences surviving in the Code that are in-
56. See Zelinsky, Response, supra note 1, at 897 nn.88-89.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 21-33.
58. Developers and investors will presumably be induced to build or invest in low-
income housing only if their after-tax return on low-income housing is greater, by virtue
of the tax incentives, than their after-tax return on comparable, alternative investments.
The spread between the after-tax returns of tax-preferred and fully-taxable investments is
a source of tax inequity between taxpayers who are otherwise similarly-situated. For a
fuller treatment of this issue, see Yorio, supra note 1, at 397-408 nn.14-73.
59. See Zelinsky, Response, supra. note 1, at 2223 nn.78-79.
60. Professor Zelinsky himself endorses food stamps as "a better approach to the
nutritional problems of the poor than a refundable tax credit." See Zelinsky, Response,
supra note 1, at 890 nn.39-40. Perhaps his support for food stamps also derives from the
seeming inefficiency of requiring the poor to file tax returns solely to obtain refundable
credits.
61. See supra text accompanying notes 12-16.
[Vol. 55
1987] FUTURE OF TAX REFORM 907
defensible from the perspective of both tax equity and efficiency.62
Compared to Professor Zelinsky,63 I am more optimistic that Congress
will eventually enact tax reforms that we would both support. To be
sure, digesting the reforms contained in the 1986 Act may take time; and
taxpayers whose oxen may be gored by future reform of the Code may
have more political clout than those taxpayers disadvantaged by the 1986
Act. Neither is a reason to shrink from advocating tax reform, nor, if
reform is needed, is there reason to assume that political support will not
eventually materialize. As Professor Zelinsky correctly notes, liberals,
supply-siders, and tax expenditure critics all have an interest in broaden-
ing the income tax base.'
62. See Yorio, supra note 1, at 413.
63. In his view, further reform efforts like those that culminated in the 1986 Act are
"neither feasible nor entirely desirable." See Zelinsky, Response, supra note 1, at 885.
64. See id. at 887-88 nn.13-29.

